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ABSTRACT 
 Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA) is a major part of the civil aircraft safety assessment process described in Aerospace 
Recommended Practice 4761 (ARP4761). It considers safety effects that systems/items installed in the same zone (i.e. a 
defined area within the aircraft body) may have on each other. Although the ZSA may be conducted at any design stage, 
it would be most cost-effective to do it during preliminary design, due to the greater opportunity for influence on system 
and structural designs and architecture. The existing ZSA methodology of ARP4761 was analysed but it was found to be 
more suitable for detail design rather than preliminary design. The authors therefore developed a methodology that would 
be more suitable for preliminary design and named it the Preliminary Zonal Safety Analysis (PZSA). This new 
methodology was verified by means of the use of a case-study, based on the NASA N3-X project.  Several lessons were 
learnt from the case study, leading to refinement of the proposed method. These lessons included focusing on the 
positional layout of major components for the zonal safety inspection, and using the Functional Hazard Analysis 
(FHA)/Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to identify system external failure modes. The resulting PZSA needs further refinement, 
but should prove to be a useful design tool for the preliminary design process. 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, system safety analysis was primarily based 
on system schematics [1]. Although this approach provided 
an overview of the different systems in the aircraft, it could 
not identify any system physical installation implications 
that might adversely affect the independence between items. 
Therefore, it was necessary to define an analysis to consider 
the installation conditions of respective systems/items and 
the effects that they may have on each other within the same 
zone. This analysis is known as the Zonal Safety Analysis 
(ZSA) [1].    
 ZSA constitutes part of the safety assessment process of 
Aerospace Recommended Practice 4761 (ARP4761) – 
“Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety 
Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and 
Equipment”, which comprises the generation of 
requirements, as well as verification to support aircraft 
development activities [2]. Although ZSA may be performed 
at any design stage, it would be most cost-effective to do it 
during preliminary design because of the opportunity for 
influence on system design and architecture [1].  
However, the ZSA methodology provided in ARP4761 is 
more suitable for the detailed design stage where the detailed 
functions, architectures and requirements have become 
available for analysis. These are inputs such as installation 
drawings, component Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) results and Preliminary System Safety Assessments 
(PSSAs). These do not have enough detail during the 
preliminary design stage. Hence, there is a need to develop a 
ZSA methodology that is better suited to guide aircraft 
designers during preliminary design. 
This paper outlines the development of a methodology, 
hereafter referred to as the Preliminary Zonal Safety 
Analysis (PZSA). It is to be used to perform ZSAs during 
preliminary design, with a focus on advanced aircraft 
technologies. 
The development process was to start with a literature 
review, including relevant information on the aircraft design 
[3] and safety assessment processes [1][2]. The existing 
ZSA, was to be analysed to understand its objectives, as well 
as the inputs and outputs required. Documents relating to 
aircraft zone partitioning [4] and risk assessment [5], as well 
as any related past theses [6], were also to be studied.  
The next objective was to develop an initial PZSA 
Methodology for Preliminary Aircraft Design, based on any 
limitations of the existing method. This was then to be 
examined by using a relevant case-study. The NASA N3-X 
project was chosen for this, as the initial systems and 
structures design and architecture layout data were available 
to the authors.   
The initial PZSA Methodology was then to be used on 
the selected aircraft. Zone partitioning was to be performed, 
with a focus on the aft fuselage where the advanced 
technologies were located i.e., fuel cell and cryogenic 
refrigeration systems. The design and installation drawings 
were then to be analysed and the systems/items located 
within the zones of interest were to be identified. After 
understanding the intrinsic hazards, a list of 
system/component external failure modes was to be 
developed. At the same time, the design and installation 
guidelines were to be consolidated. A zonal safety inspection 
was then to be conducted using these two lists as a guide and 
any deviations found from a risk assessment. 
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 Appropriate follow-up actions were to be recommended, 
such as modifications to design or maintenance practices.  
Issues encountered during the case study were to be 
recorded, discussed and used to refine the initial PZSA 
Methodology. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL ZSA 
PROCESS 
The ZSA methodology stated in ARP4761 was analysed 
with the objective of developing one that is better suited for 
preliminary aircraft design. Figure 1 shows this process.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Zonal Safety Analysis Process (ARP4761) [1] 
 
The original ZSA methodology described in ARP4761 
was found to be more suitable for detailed aircraft design. 
For example, it requires certain inputs such as the 
“considerations from PSSA” and “system PSSAs” which are 
only available at the end of preliminary design or beginning 
of detail design. These inputs are not available to the aircraft 
designer during preliminary design.  
Another example that suggests the original methodology 
is better suited for detail aircraft design is the identification 
of outputs such as “modifications” and “effects considered 
in relevant System Safety Assessments (SSAs)”. These are 
actions taken at the final design stage.   
In addition, the original ZSA methodology does not 
provide any references or information sources to obtain the 
“experience” and “maintenance and operational hazards” 
inputs. Hence, it may be difficult for an inexperienced 
aircraft designer to use the methodology meaningfully. It 
would be beneficial to include some references that provide 
the relevant industry knowledge e.g., Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Standards (AS) to act as inputs 
to “experience” and “maintenance and operational hazards”.  
The original methodology also assumes that all 
components have already been designed and the relevant 
information is available to develop the “list of component 
external failure modes”. However, this is not the case during 
the preliminary design stage where the system architecture is 
being developed and components are being designed. It 
would only be possible to develop a list of external failure 
modes at the system level instead of component level during 
preliminary design.  
Finally, the methodology does not specify a mechanism 
to perform risk assessments of zonal safety inspection 
findings. After performing the zonal safety inspection, it is 
important to carry out a proper assessment of non-
conformances to determine their safety criticality so that the 
appropriate corrective actions can be taken. A systematic 
approach such as the risk assessment matrix stated in 
ARP5151 could be adopted to perform a qualitative risk 
assessment. 
Based on the above analysis, changes (highlighted in 
green) were made to the ZSA methodology for it to be more 
suitable for preliminary aircraft design (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Proposed PZSA Methodology for Preliminary Design 
 
The next step is to test and verify the methodology by 
applying it on an aircraft design. 
 
CASE STUDY AIRCRAFT 
The aircraft selected to be the case study for this research 
was the NASA N3-X (see Figure 3). Since the N3-X systems 
design and architecture layout had been completed (which is 
reflective of a preliminary design), it would be suitable to 
apply the proposed PZSA methodology on this aircraft. An 
additional benefit was that the authors were involved in the 
group design project and had access to the aircraft’s systems 
and structure designs. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. NASA N3-X [7] 
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The NASA N3-X has a unique hybrid wing body (HWB) 
configuration. This configuration achieves a much higher 
lift-to-drag ratio compared to conventional shaped aircraft, 
thus achieving significant savings in fuel burn, aircraft 
weight and required thrust. The aircraft design also 
incorporates advanced technologies such as the turboelectric 
distributed propulsion (TeDP) and cryogenic refrigeration 
systems. The TeDP system comprises 2 turboshaft engines 
and 14 electric fans. Superconducting generators are driven 
by the engines and power is transmitted to power inverters 
via superconducting transmission lines. Then, the power is 
transmitted to the superconducting fan motors which drive 
the electric fans permitting boundary layer ingestion (BLI), 
thus providing aerodynamic benefits. The advantage of using 
superconducting material is that it allows for high power 
efficiency, but the system has to be operated at low critical 
temperatures. Therefore, cryogenic refrigeration is used, 
which comes in the form of liquid hydrogen (LH2) or 
cryocoolers which can achieve very low temperatures of 
between 20K and 65K [9]. 
The NASA N3-X aircraft is required to have a similar 
passenger seat capacity and payload range compared to its 
competitors i.e., accommodation capacity of 300 passengers; 
range of 7,500nm with a payload of 53,515kg. But it shall 
consume less fuel when traveling the same distances. 
Specifically, the target is for the N3-X to achieve 60% less 
fuel burn compared to the Boeing 777-200LR. The N3-X 
shall be able to meet the airworthiness conditions attached to 
its novel configuration/systems [8]. 
 
AIRCRAFT ZONE PARTITIONING 
Using the Boeing 747 zone diagram as a reference [4], 
the NASA N3-X aircraft was divided into 8 major zones 
covering different areas such as the fuselage, power plants 
and struts, empennage, wings, doors and landing gears (see 
Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Major Zone Locations of NASA N3-X Aircraft  
 
The major zones were subsequently broken down further 
into sub-major zones such as passenger cabins, power plants 
and fairings (see Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Breakdown of Major Zone 200 into Sub-Major Zones 
 
Smaller items/areas within these sub-major zones, such 
as specific fairings, engine cowl panels and fuselage doors 
were then designated as zones. Specifically, the case study 
focused on the aft fuselage where the advanced technologies 
were located. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of sub-major 
zone 260 into zones. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Breakdown of Sub-Major Zone 260 into Zones 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF ZONAL 
SYSTEMS/ITEMS 
Subsequently, the aircraft design drawings were analysed 
and the systems/items located within the zones of interest 
were identified. Since the focus of the study is on advanced 
technologies, the zones containing the cryogenic 
refrigeration system are examined in detail [9][10][11][12]. 
Figure 7 shows the systems/items located within zones 
261/262. 
 
4 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Systems/Items in Zones 261/262 (LH2 Configuration) 
 
The identified systems/items in each zone were then 
studied carefully to understand their preliminary design, 
system architecture and functions, as well as the maintenance 
hazards involved. This is important as it will facilitate the 
zonal safety inspection process later.  
For example, the main purpose of having H2 on the 
NASA N3-X is to provide cryogenic refrigeration for the 
high temperature superconducting (HTS) components (e.g., 
generators, motors) and transmission lines, as well as 
generate power for primary/secondary systems [11]. The 
cryogenic fuel (H2) feed architecture is shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Cryogenic Fuel (H2) Feed Architecture [11] 
 
The submerged pumps in the LH2 storage tanks provide the 
required pressure to transfer LH2 from the tanks to the wing-
tip mounted turbogenerator and propulsor fan motor heat 
exchangers via pipelines. After passing through the heat 
exchangers, the LH2 is converted to GH2 and channelled to 
the fuel cells via cryogenic pipelines. Any remaining 
hydrogen after the chemical reaction is returned to the LH2 
storage tanks via a compressor. There are a total of four 
cryogenic pipelines in each wing. Two of them are LH2 
pipelines leading from the LH2 storage tank to the wing-tip 
mounted turbogenerator, whereas the other two are GH2 
pipelines (containing HTS transmission lines) from the 
wing-tip mounted turbogenerator to the fuel cells and 
propulsor fan motors [11]. The pipelines routing from the 
LH2 storage tanks to the fuel cells and propulsor fan motors 
are shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. LH2 Storage Tanks and Cryogenic Pipelines [11] 
 
There is a cross-feed valve installed between adjacent 
pipelines to the motors to provide redundancy. Hence, any 
single pipeline failure can be overcome by supplying LH2 
across the cross-feed line. As for the LH2 storage tank, it 
comprises an internal tank (containing the LH2) surrounded 
by an insulation layer made of rigid closed cell 
polyvinachloride, which is then encapsulated by an external 
tank. This aim of this design is to keep the surface 
temperature of the internal tank low and minimise the boil-
off mass of the stored LH2 during the flight. The tanks are 
made of aluminium to reduce weight and resist hydrogen 
embrittlement. The fluid in the tank consists of 98% LH2 and 
2% GH2 at a temperature of around 20K [11]. 
There is also a refuel/defuel and vent subsystem for the 
LH2 cryogenic system to refill/empty the LH2 storage tanks, 
and vent GH2 in the event of excessive pressure build-up in 
the tanks [11]. The refuel/defuel and vent system architecture 
is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. LH2 Refuel/Defuel and Vent Architecture [11] 
 
The tank pressure relief valve assembly consists of two 
relief valves and one electrically-powered shut-off valve. 
The two relief valves allow for system redundancy - One 
relief valve acts as the ‘’primary’’ valve and maintains a 
pressure of 1.4 bar while the other relief valve is the 
‘’secondary’’ valve and maintains pressure at 1.55 bar. The 
electrically-powered shut-off valve also acts as a vent valve 
[11].  
The tank removal procedure involves the use of three 
mini-hoists which are secured to the tank via cable 
attachment points. The tank is then tilted until a desirable 
angle is achieved so that the tank can be lowered through the 
lower fuselage access panel (see Figure 11).  
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Figure 11. Securing and Tilting of LH2 Storage Tank [13] 
 
The tank is gradually lowered until it comes in contact 
with a trailer. Then, the tank is tilted in the opposite manner 
so that it is placed horizontally on the trailer [13]. Figure 12 
illustrates this process.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Placement of LH2 Storage Tank onto Trailer [13] 
 
The LH2 storage tank has to be tilted during the removal 
process because the lower fuselage tank removal panel is 
shorter in length compared to the tank. This is due to the 
requirement to have a separate access panel for maintenance 
personnel, which limits the length of the lower fuselage tank 
removal panel [13]. Figure 13 shows the locations of these 
panels.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. Location of Panels on Aircraft Lower Fuselage [13] 
 
DESIGN AND INSTALLATION 
GUIDELINES 
The design and installation guidelines are mainly derived 
from the SAE Aerospace Standards (AS) which include 
recommended practices and information reports. These 
documents are sources of industry experience and provide 
knowledge on maintenance and operational hazards [14]. 
However, the author could not find any relevant standards 
regarding the design and installation of the LH2 storage 
system and fuel cell in the SAE archive of aerospace industry 
documents. This is probably because these systems have not 
been utilised in commercial aircraft yet. Therefore, the 
author expanded his search beyond the aerospace industry 
and found relevant information in the ground vehicle 
industry (i.e., J2578 – Recommended Practice for General 
Fuel Cell Vehicle Safety [15] and J2579 – Standard for Fuel 
Systems in Fuel Cell and Other Hydrogen Vehicles [16]). 
Using the above-stated database, the author developed the 
design and installation guidelines for the various zonal 
systems/items based on specific references (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Systems/Items in Zones 261/262 (LH2 Configuration) 
 
 
 
Some of the design and installation guidelines developed 
for the LH2 cryogenic system are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Some of the Design and Installation Guidelines for LH2 
Cryogenic System 
 
 
 
LIST OF SYSTEM EXTERNAL 
FAILURE MODES 
With the information from the relevant SAE AS, 
Aerospace Information Report (AIR) and Aerospace 
Recommended Practice (ARP), the intrinsic hazards of the 
respective systems which could pose a danger to personnel 
safety or have an adverse effect on equipment were 
identified. As an example, the intrinsic hazards of the LH2 
cryogenic system are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. LH2 Cryogenic System Intrinsic Hazards 
 
 
 
During the case study, the Failure Modes and Effects 
(FMES) was found to be incomplete as not all the system 
components had been finalised. Nevertheless, the system 
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Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) were available as the system architecture 
had been designed. Since the FHA established the failure 
conditions as well as their effects on the aircraft, crew and 
occupants, and the FTA determined the causes of a particular 
undesirable event, they provided relevant inputs to establish 
the list of system/item external failure modes having an 
effect on other systems/items installed in the same zone. 
With the system/item intrinsic hazards and FHA/FTA as 
inputs, the list of system external failure modes was 
developed. As an example, the external failure modes of the 
LH2 cryogenic system are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. LH2 Cryogenic System External Failure Modes 
 
 
 
Besides affecting other systems in the same zone, the 
external failure modes in the highlighted boxes above were 
determined to have a potential effect on other zones as well. 
 
ZONAL SAFETY INSPECTION 
Since there was a lack of detailed electrical wiring and 
component installation drawings at the preliminary design 
stage, the zonal safety inspection focused on conformance to 
system design guidelines and examined the architectural 
layout of the respective components. The system external 
failure modes were also taken into account to identify any 
shortcomings in the preliminary system design which may 
have an adverse effect on other systems. As an example, the 
inspection results for the LH2 cryogenic system are shown in 
Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. LH2 Cryogenic System Inspection Findings 
 
 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
All findings from the zonal safety inspection were 
assessed for their risk level using the risk assessment matrix 
found in ARP5151 [5], which assesses the severity and 
probability of a potential hazard. The risk assessment matrix 
intersection of the hazard probability and severity defines the 
relative risk of the hazard (see Table 6).    
 
Table 6. Risk Assessment Matrix (ARP5151) [5] 
 
HAZARD 
PROBABILITY 
HAZARD SEVERITY 
CATASTROPHIC 
Fatal injury or 
aircraft severe 
damage or loss 
CRITICAL 
Severe 
injury or 
substantial 
a/c damage 
MARGINAL 
Minor 
injury or 
minor 
damage 
NEGLIGIBLE 
No 
significant 
effects 
FREQUENT 
Continuously 
experienced 
Extremely 
High 
Extremely 
High 
High Medium 
PROBABLE  
Will occur 
frequently 
Extremely 
High 
High Medium Low 
OCCASIONAL  
Will occur several 
times 
High High Medium Low 
REMOTE 
Unlikely, but can be 
expected to occur 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
IMPROBABLE 
Extremely unlikely 
to occur, but 
possible 
Low Low Low Low 
 
The risk assessment was conducted qualitatively based 
on possible consequences and likelihood of hazard 
occurrence. The risk assessment process is shown in Table 7 
using two of the inspection findings as examples.  
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Table 7. Examples of Risk Assessment Process 
 
 
 
In summary, out of the 56 safety findings, there were 10 
counts of “extremely high” risk, 7 counts of “high” risk, 33 
counts of “medium” risk and 6 counts of “low” risk (see 
Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Summary of Risk Assessment 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
MITIGATE RISKS 
After assessing the hazard risk level, the next step is to 
identify the root causes and extent of the problem. This 
enables the appropriate corrective action (i.e., modification 
to design or maintenance practice) to be adopted. Here are 
some examples of the proposed recommendations to mitigate 
the “extremely high” risks (represented by red-coloured 
boxes) found in zones 261/262 (see Figure 14).  
 
 
 
Figure 14. “Extremely High” and “High” Risks in Zones 
261/262 
 
Example #1: 
Affected System/Component: LH2 Storage Tanks 
Risk Level: Extremely High 
Description of Hazard: LH2 storage tank might 
fracture/break resulting in hydrogen seepage/leakage (i.e., 
fire risk). 
Root Cause(s): Lack of detailed study regarding the effect 
of fuselage structural loading on the LH2 storage tanks - the 
selection of aluminium as the material for both inner and 
outer tanks may not be suitable (aluminium has low strength 
and becomes too brittle for use at low temperatures of 20K). 
Recommendation(s): Material with higher strength and 
toughness, as well as better compatibility when working at 
low temperatures, such as aluminium 5000 series alloys (in 
the as-welded condition) and 300 series stainless steel (in the 
annealed condition) should be selected. It is recommended 
that aluminium 5000 series alloy be used as the inner tank 
material since there is relatively low structural loading. The 
outer tank can be made of 321 corrosion-resistant steel as it 
has higher strength and toughness – it will be able to protect 
the rigid closed cell polyvinachloride insulation layer and 
inner tank from any external forces (e.g. impact loading). 
This will achieve a balance between minimising weight and 
ensuring system integrity. 
 
Example #2: 
Affected System/Component: LH2 Storage Tanks 
Risk Level: High 
Description of Hazard: LH2 storage tank might 
fracture/break resulting in hydrogen seepage/ leakage (i.e., 
fire risk). 
Root Cause(s): Tank removal/installation procedures are 
too complex and will introduce uneven loads on the tank 
surface (due to tilting); the tank is also susceptible to knocks 
while tilting which will affect the structural integrity of the 
tank.  
Recommendation(s): Relocate the access panel for 
maintenance personnel away from the axis of the LH2 
storage tanks to below the fuel cell. (It has been verified that 
there is sufficient height clearance of at least 1 metre between 
the lower working platform and the fuel cell – this will 
enable maintenance personnel to climb up to the lower 
working platform and access the LH2 storage tanks from 
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there.) This will allow the lower fuselage tank removal 
panels to be re-designed such that they are at least as long as 
the LH2 storage tanks. Therefore, there will no longer be any 
requirement to tilt the LH2 storage tanks during removal and 
they can be lowered horizontally onto the trailer. This 
eliminates the risk of introducing uneven loads on the tank 
surface (due to tilting) and incurring any knocks while trying 
to lower the tank through a smaller gap. Figure 15 shows the 
recommended locations of the panels. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Recommended Locations of Lower Fuselage Panels 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The proposed recommendations have enhanced the 
preliminary design of the NASA N3-X aircraft in terms of 
system and maintenance safety. By following the steps stated 
in the PZSA methodology, the preliminary aircraft 
configuration was partitioned into zones; systems and 
components were identified for each zone; design and 
installation guidelines were developed for the respective 
systems; system external failure modes were derived for 
each zone; zonal safety inspection was performed; risk 
assessment was carried out for any safety findings and 
recommendations were proposed to mitigate hazards with 
“high” risk level and above. Therefore, this methodology 
provided a holistic approach of analysing aircraft safety at 
the preliminary design stage, by considering both intra- and 
inter-system effects within the same zone. This was verified 
using the NASA N3-X aircraft as a case study.  
Nonetheless, there are several lessons learnt from the 
case study and the PZSA methodology can still be improved. 
First, the input to facilitate the development of design and 
installation guidelines could be expanded beyond SAE 
Aerospace Standards to include other information sources. 
This would be useful especially when dealing with advanced 
technologies that have not been implemented in the aviation 
industry. For example, LH2 has been used as a fuel in 
automobiles and the ground vehicle industry already has the 
relevant experience and expertise. Therefore, the author 
developed the design and installation guidelines for the fuel 
cell based on J2578 – Recommended Practice for General 
Fuel Cell Vehicle Safety. Similarly, the design and 
installation guidelines for the LH2 storage system were based 
on J2579 – Standard for Fuel Systems in Fuel Cell and Other 
Hydrogen Vehicles.  
Another issue was the lack of detailed electrical wiring 
and component installation drawings available to conduct the 
zonal safety inspection. This was because the routing of 
electrical wires and the type of brackets/hoses/couplings to 
be used for component installation had not been determined 
by the NASA N3-X aircraft designers. In retrospect, this was 
reflective of an actual preliminary design phase where the 
aircraft configuration had just been “frozen” with only the 
major items being designed [3]. Therefore, it was not 
practical to perform an inspection on component installation 
at the preliminary aircraft design stage. Instead, it would be 
more beneficial to check on the overall architecture of the 
system components by inspecting the positional layout of 
major components. For example, food containers which may 
have spillages should not be positioned above electrical 
equipment to avoid shorting. 
The third issue was the lack of component FMEA details 
during the preliminary design stage to facilitate the 
identification of system external failure modes. This was 
because details of the system components have not been 
finalised during the preliminary design stage and it was not 
possible to carry out the FMEA for all system components 
yet. Nevertheless, the system FHA and FTA on the system 
had been finalised and could be used as inputs to derive the 
list of system external failure modes. The FHA identified the 
system failure conditions as well as their effects on the 
aircraft, crew and occupants, while the FTA determined the 
causes of a particular undesirable event. Therefore, they 
could still provide inputs to establish the list of system/item 
external failure modes having an effect on other 
systems/items installed in the same zone. 
The fourth way to improve the methodology was by 
considering the inter-zonal failure effects of particular 
system external failure modes when performing the zonal 
safety inspection. As mentioned earlier, some of the system 
external failure modes were determined to have a potential 
effect on other zones and should be included in the zonal 
safety inspection for the affected zones. For example, any 
leakage from the LH2 storage tanks would result in the 
formation of gaseous hydrogen which can seep into the 
surrounding zones – resulting in a flammable environment 
(i.e., fire risk).  
Using the NASA N3-X case study, an example of such 
an inter-zonal failure effect that could affect zones 261 and 
262 was the turboshaft engine rotor burst. Although the 
engine is located outside of zones 261 and 262, a rotor burst 
may penetrate and damage components within these zones. 
Figure 16 shows the aircraft portions that are affected by an 
engine rotor burst (highlighted in red). 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Portions Affected By Engine Rotor Burst 
(Highlighted in Red) [11] 
 
The engine rotor burst analysis shows that the LH2 
storage tanks, helium cryocoolers and cryogenic pipelines 
leading to the wing-tip turbogenerator heat exchangers are 
located outside of the turboshaft engine rotor burst zones. 
However, the cryogenic pipelines from the LH2 storage tanks 
leading to the propulsor fan motor heat exchangers are 
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located within the engine rotor burst zone [11]. Applying the 
risk assessment matrix found in ARP5151, it was assessed to 
have “catastrophic” hazard severity and “improbable” 
hazard probability. Therefore, the hazard risk level was 
“low”. Since it was a certification requirement to design for 
protection against rotor burst, it was recommended that some 
parts of the aircraft aft fuselage should be reinforced to 
provide protection against rotor penetration. Figure 17 shows 
the parts of the aft fuselage to be reinforced (indicated in 
red). 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Portions of Aft Fuselage Recommended for 
Reinforcement 
 
From this example of an engine rotor burst, it is seen that 
inter-zonal failure effects can influence system/structural 
design significantly. Therefore, it is important to include 
them in the PZSA methodology to provide a complete safety 
analysis of the entire aircraft. Figure 18 shows the refined 
PZSA methodology to be used for preliminary aircraft 
design (refinements are indicated in orange). 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Refined PZSA Methodology for Preliminary Aircraft 
Design 
CONCLUSIONS 
In order to develop a PZSA methodology that was 
suitable for preliminary aircraft design, the methodologies 
found in ARP4761 and related past year thesis were 
analysed. Opportunities for improvement were identified and 
a new methodology was proposed. It was then applied to a 
selected aircraft – NASA N3-X as a case study to verify the 
procedural steps. 
From the case study, several lessons were learnt which 
led to the refinement of the methodology. The lessons 
include (1) Expansion of inputs beyond SAE Aerospace 
Standards to include other sources relating to advanced 
technologies, (2) Re-focusing of the zonal safety inspection 
to cover system design and architectural layout, (3) Inclusion 
of system FHAs/FTAs as inputs to develop the list of system 
external failure modes, and (4) Considering the inter-zonal 
failure effects of system external failure modes when 
performing the zonal safety inspection.  
In conclusion, the refined PZSA methodology had been 
tested and verified through a case study of the NASA N3-X 
aircraft design. The methodology should be adopted by 
aircraft designers during preliminary design as it would 
enhance aircraft design safety by considering intra- and 
inter-system effects within the same zone. In addition, it 
would help the project to reduce design/development costs 
by identifying system interference issues early, and avoiding 
costly modifications during the later design/development 
stages. 
 
FURTHER WORK 
There are two areas where further work may be carried 
out. First, the input sources for “experience” (as mentioned 
in the methodology) can be expanded beyond SAE to include 
other relevant agencies such as NASA. This is especially for 
advanced technologies which may have already been 
practised in spacecraft, but have not been implemented in the 
aviation industry. Second, the risk assessment of safety 
findings can be taken one step further by quantifying the 
associated risks. This can be done using the Acceptable 
Means of Compliance (AMC) 25.1309 on systems design 
and analysis. This would provide a more in-depth risk 
assessment of the hazards. 
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